Original Zhao long’s bottom line thinking
Text/Observer Network columnist Zhao Long
Deputy Director and Researcher, Institute of Global Governance, Shanghai Institute of International Studies
Since the beginning of the year, the mentality changes of the United States, Europe, Russia, Ukraine and other parties about the Ukrainian crisis have gone through several obvious stages. On the one hand, "Ukraine can’t lose" is still the clearest target bottom line for the United States, Europe and Ukraine; On the other hand, strategic anxiety and war fatigue are constantly affecting social and political consensus, especially reflected in the domestic political agenda of some countries.
In this context, is a "long ceasefire" equal to a "long peace"? How to define the standard of victory and failure? How to evaluate the future applicability of "East-West Germany" and "Peninsula Model" in Ukraine is no longer a taboo topic discussed by all parties.
After Trump won the election, his campaign slogan of "ending the Ukrainian crisis within 24 hours" ignited the expectations of all parties for a ceasefire.
On November 16th, local time, Ukrainian President Zelensky said in an interview with the media that he was convinced that the war would end "faster than before" after Trump took office, and Ukraine would "make every effort to ensure that the war would end next year".
It is undeniable that in the Trump 2.0 period, Russia and Ukraine resumed some form of contact and even started ceasefire negotiations, which is worth looking forward to. To put it simply, Trump’s position on the Ukrainian crisis may include three aspects:
First, by threatening to interrupt aid, Ukraine was forced to return to the negotiating table and asked to make non-sovereign compromises on territorial issues;
Second, let Europe bear more economic costs, including expanding the procurement of American weapons to aid Ukraine and the main part of the funds needed for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine;
The third is to "freeze conflicts" based on Russia’s actual control line and persuade Russia to complete the transaction.
However, there seems to be some illusion that Trump can quickly end the war. In fact, Trump’s return is a necessary condition for Ukraine to achieve peace, but it is not a sufficient condition. Because although all parties support the resumption of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, there are many differences on what to talk about and how to talk about it.
For example, Europe insists that negotiations must be "beneficial to Ukraine", while Russia emphasizes "based on territorial reality" and the Istanbul Consensus in April 2022. Countries in the south of the world emphasize a ceasefire as soon as possible from the perspective of reducing casualties. According to the experience of various regional conflicts and local wars in the past, after the parties resume contact, they still need to complete a temporary ceasefire, start negotiations, establish a demilitarized zone, sign a ceasefire agreement, and establish an international supervision mechanism, so as to achieve lasting peace.
At the same time, the huge casualties suffered by Russia and Ukraine on the battlefield in the past three years and the contradiction of sovereignty over 18% of Ukraine’s total territory have determined that it is difficult for a single country or individual to achieve a ceasefire and stop the war on its own.
For Trump and his "MAGA" (Make America Great Again) line, reducing the economic cost paid by the American people for the Ukrainian crisis is the core concern. If Europe is willing to bear more economic costs and increase the purchase of American weapons to aid Ukraine, Trump may not exclude the Ukrainian crisis from continuing in a low-intensity way for the sake of maximizing his own interests. Even if the United States completely stops aid, Europe’s commitment and determination to support Ukraine cannot be underestimated, including continuing to break through legal disputes and using frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine.
What’s more, the "peace plan" proposed by Trump and his team involves "establishing a demilitarized zone according to the existing contact line, Ukraine’s commitment not to join NATO within 20 years, and establishing a ceasefire monitoring mechanism with the participation of a third party". These potential plans have been discussed many times in various second-track dialogues, and they are not very creative new ideas. Among them, European countries, not the United States, are responsible for supervising the implementation of the ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, and the vague statements on sensitive issues such as territorial control and ownership have led all parties to question the enforceability of the "peace plan."
For Russia, compared with the political and economic costs caused by the delay of the war, a simple "freezing conflict" may not be the best option. Before Trump takes office, Russia may launch a new wave of offensive against Ukraine, and set the main goal as to recover the "lost land" in Kursk region, and strive to limit the focus of future negotiations to the areas that Russia has not controlled in the four eastern Ukrainian States, instead of simply ceasing fire according to the actual contact line.
The most important thing is that Putin and the establishment forces in Russia have absolute distrust of the United States and Europe and will not be easily satisfied with signing the 3.0 version of the Minsk Agreement under the political commitment of the United States and Europe. This is why the future peace plan cannot be limited to the coordination between Russia, Ukraine, the United States and Europe, and other countries need to participate.
On November 19, local time, some pictures of the explosion of GRAU armory appeared on overseas social platforms.
It is worth noting that out of concern that Trump may force Ukraine to compromise with Russia after taking office, Biden will not only consider how to characterize the Ukrainian crisis as a "legacy" in the last two months of his administration, especially how to unite allies to contain Russia’s achievements, but also pay attention to how to create a "trap", vigorously promote NATO to fulfill its existing military aid commitments, and strengthen Ukraine’s offensive and defensive capabilities on the battlefield and its negotiating position outside the battlefield.
At the same time, Biden may tolerate or even let the limited controllable escalation of the battlefield, preventing Trump from making a deal with Russia as a "abandoned child". Recently, Biden’s lifting of Ukraine’s restrictions on using long-range weapons aided by the United States to attack targets in Russia is an example of this change in position. On November 19th, the "RBC- Ukraine" news agency quoted an insider of the Ukrainian army as saying that the Ukrainian army had used ATACMS to attack a military facility near Karachev, Bryansk, Russia.
At the same time, the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has aroused great concern from all sides at a critical period when the Ukrainian crisis may enter "talking while fighting".
Theoretically, the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK under the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty belongs to the category of bilateral relations in nature, and the article 4 of the Treaty concerning "military mutual assistance" cannot be simply equated with the NATO standard "military alliance". According to the Treaty, when Russia and the DPRK provide military assistance to each other in the face of aggression or in a state of war, it is necessary to comply with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant domestic laws.
Judging from the background and content of the signing of the Treaty, it remains to be seen whether military cooperation based on similar environmental perception, interest perception and strategic needs can solve the shortcomings of the fragility and singleness of mutually beneficial relations.
On November 16th, the Financial Times quoted the Ukrainian intelligence assessment report as saying that North Korea had provided Russia with 50 170mm M1989 self-propelled howitzers and 20 upgraded 240mm multi-barrel rocket launching systems. The picture shows the "main gun" shot in Russia.
For China, such cooperation may strengthen the linkage between "European security" and "Asian security", and provide more "reasons" for NATO members in Europe to strengthen their substantive presence in the Asia-Pacific region. If the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK goes beyond the geographical restrictions, it may break the consensus that a third country does not directly intervene in the Ukrainian crisis, causing concern about the spillover of the battlefield and the escalation of war.
Considering the high political sensitivity of this issue, it is believed that Russia will give priority to its own territory in positioning military cooperation, and may refer to the mode of NATO’s military advisers, technicians and various mercenaries and volunteers stationed in Ukraine to create a "gray zone" for military mutual assistance, so as to avoid sending North Korean soldiers to eastern Ukraine to directly participate in combat, thus triggering a qualitative change in the Ukrainian crisis.
What needs to be made clear is that China’s main concern is to ensure that there will be no war and chaos on the peninsula and that the "battlefield will not spill over, the war will not escalate, and all parties will not fire" in the Ukrainian crisis.
Since creating the image of "President of Peace" may become one of the main contents of Trump’s political legacy, he may seek positive interaction with China in order to promote the Ukrainian crisis, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the relaxation and stability of the situation on the peninsula after taking office. The dialogue between China and the United States on these international and regional hot issues is also expected to become a lubricant for the fierce struggle between the two countries on issues such as economy, trade, science and technology.
But frankly speaking, Trump’s interest in bringing China into the Ukrainian peace process may be limited until his unilateral "persuasion and promotion of talks" encounters resistance or even fails.
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Original title: "Trump can immediately end the Russian-Ukrainian war when he takes office? This may be an illusion.
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